Introduction
This paper analyses the textual and pragmatic properties of a sentence form which has attracted little scholarly attention, presumably because of its infrequent occunence. The following provides two examples of the construction:
(1) {t's not that he hates the press the way Nixon did, it's just that he is insensitive to the press'role in our society. (L.A.Times l2lI8l83)
The construction is of interest first because it appears to be universal; second because an analysis of its occurrence and interpretation illustrates some of the activities pertormed by participants in discourse, the resources that language and languages make available for those activities, the principles that govern the interactions between language and context, and the ways in which speakers can manipulate those resources for narrative purposes; and third, because its successful analysis provides support for the principles and assumptions used to account for it. I will argue that the subordinate clause of the construction represents an interpretation of its local discourse context, which in turn licenses the derivation of a range of locally specific inferential connections between the context and the clause. These characteristics can be accounted for by Grice's cooperative principle (CP) and maxims of conversation.
I have been looking for examples of this sentence type for several years, but have so far collected only 85. The infrequency of the construction is matched by the infrequency with which it is mentioned by linguists. I know of only seven references to it, and in three of these the construction is mentioned merely as an appendix to the discussion of another sentence form. Delahunty (1982) mentions it as a type of cleft sentence, a position endorsed by Declerck (1988 Declerck ( , 1992 , (but see Collins 199I); Quirk et al. (1985) mention it in a footnote to their discussion of obligatory extrapositive constructions; Kuno (1973) discusses the Japanese analogue,, the no desu construction.z
The form had no generally used name, and I eventually settled on inferential. The reason for this name will, I trust, become clear as we proceed.
The present study is based on a corpus of instances of the construction along with as much prior and following context as seems relevant. The instances are taken from a range of text types. Most come from written sources, both fiction and nonfiction, literary, scholarly, and journalistic; a few were spoken, in both radio editorials and informal conversation. Although the current work focuses on the English inferential construction, the construction exists in a number of other languages and may be universal.3 I begin by providing a brief grammatical overview of the inferential construction, describing how it can be modified by negation, modals, adverbs, and complementizers. Then, I describe the distribution of the construction in texts. Third, I describe the construction's various contextualized interpretations. Fourth, I briefly discuss negative inferentials. Finally, I relate the interpretation of inferentials to Grice's notion of implicature.
Grammatical overview of the inferential construction
Inferentials, in English, are sentences in which a tensed subordinate clause is embedded as the complement of a form of. bea whose subject is expletive ir. I will refer to the embedded clause of an inferential, corresponding to that he hates the press the way Nixon did and that he is insensitive to the press' role in our society in (1), as "the clause," and the part to which the clause is subordinate as "the matrix," corresponding to it's (rtot) (just) in (1).
" According to the October 1988 t,SA Bulletin, Karina Wilkinson was scheduled to read a paper on 'The 'It is not that ...' C-onstruction.' Unfortunately I have been unable to obtain a copy of this.
3 Th" conrtruction occurs in at least the following languages: Finnish, French, German, Modern Hebrew, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. For discussion of the construction in these languages my thanks are due to Paola Malpezzi-Price (French, Italian), Roger Gilmore and laura Gatzkiewicz (Spanish), Jon and Barbara Thiem, Roland Wolff, and Ron Walker (German), Tom Mark (Hungarian),7,ev Bar-lrv (Hebrew), David Argoff and Kaija Wilson (Finnish), Mrs. Gaughran (lrish), Emanuela Mengozzi, Flaminia Cervesi, and David McCobb (Italian), Charles Miracle (Mandarin Chinese), and W. Mary Kim (Korean, Japanese). It appears that we are not dealing with just an areal feature of Western European languages and others, like Hebrew, which are heavily influenced by them.
a Declerck (1992) claims that the be of inferentials and clefts is "specificational' in that it specifies a value for a variable. The inferential variable is derived pragmatically from the context and the clause represents its value. Thus a specificational sentence The bank robber is John Thomas answers the question Who is the bank robber (Declerck 1988: 6) . However the analogous discourse created from inferentials is ill-formed: Wat isn't it only It isnl onty that I'm nosE. ln fact wh-questions created by questioning the clause of an inferential seem to allow only an echo interpretation. It appears, therefore, that it is insufficient simply to classify inferentials as specifi cational sentences.
That the il subject of the inferential matrix is expletive, that is, nonreferential and devoitJ of semantic import, is easily demonstrated. It cannot be questioned (2), or replaced by a referring expressicin (3):
(2) *What is not only that I am nosey?
(3) *That/this is nor only thar I am nosey.
. From a linguistic universals point of view, it is reasonable to predict that any language which allows either expletive or zero subjects, has a c'opula, and has subordinate tensed clauses will possess the inferential construction. Moregver, if pragmatic principles of interpretation such as Grice's (1975) Cp an<J maxims and Sperber and Wilson's (1986) principle of relevance are indeed universal, then the construction will have very similar interpretations in all languages that have it. And this is in fact the case.
The construction allows a number of elaborations in the matrix that are textually and pragmatically signiticant.
The entire inferential structurc modified by adverbs such as perhaps:
may be (and in actual use, very otien is) (4) Perhaps, it is that women in Irelancl are nor a (Gogarty 1968: 59) The matrix may include adverbs such as only, just, and simply:
(5) It was just that it was raining. (lrving l97g: 2j3_4) firrm of prayer?
These adverbs can be negated (6), and the complementizer thnt is optional (7) and (10): 
It is not that one fears treachery. (Murdoch 1975: 43) (10) It couldn't be he'd be goin'in it agin. (sic) (Somerville and Ross 1977: 264) Modals and negation in int'erentials may occur in either or both the matrix and the clause, making possible scope relations and interpretations distinct from those in simple sentences: (11) a. It may be that I will have tasks fbryou as cruel Mother has laid on me. (Bradley 1982: 136) b. *l may will have tasks for you as cruel as those has laid on me.
as those the Great the Great Mother
The construction allows the omission of redundant matrix modals. etc. in a text in which a series of clauses are coordinated, as in:
(12) Conceivably some other factor, not well accounted for in the model, is delaying or counteracting the warming. It might be that tlrc heat capacity of the oceens is laryer than cunent models calculate, that the sun's oLttput has declined slightly or that volcanoes have injected more dust irtto the sffalosphere than is cunently known, thereby reducing the solar enetg) reaching rhe ground. (Schneider 1989:76) The matrix It might be in (12) is fbllowed by three coordinated clauses, each of which is in the scope of the modal might, which appears only once in the sentence. If the infbrmation in the clauses were expressed in a forrn other than the inferential, the modal would have to be repeated in each clause. The inferential structure thus allows an elegant and parsimonious parallelism. Relatedly, it allows modals, negation, and adverbs to be positioned so that the entire clause is within their scope, including any negation or modals within the clause. Consider:
(13) a. [t] is not that what is denied must first have been asserted. (Horn 1989: 47) b. What is denied must not first have been asserted.
In (13a) the negator takes scope over the modal: in the normalized frlrm, (13b), the reverse occurs, with consequent ditferences in interpretation. In (la) the inferential matrix provides the sole position in which only can modify the clause and carry the intended contrast with extraordinary: (14) Caesar understood well the propitiatory nature of sacrifice amongst the Gauls, but of course there was nothingextraordinary in this custom in Gaul. or in the wider Celtic domain; it was only that the Celts had retained archaic practices once also at home in ltaly, as in Greece, but now long outmoded. (Powell 19tt3: 180) Of my 85 examples, 23 are positive and unmodalized (two of these are questions); 12 are positive and modalized; and .50 are negative. Five of my examples are modified by external adverbs: Two each by perhaps and if, and one by thus. Twenty examples are internally moditied by adverbs: Five by ortly,, nineby just, three by simply, and three by (rtot) so muclt.
3. The distribution of inferentials I begin discussion of the functions of inferentials by examining their distributions in texts. Negative inferentials have the clearest distributional patterns, so I start with them.
The textual patterns in which negative inferentials occur can be described in the following taxonomy. The most striking pattern is what I call a "tandem inferential," consisting of a negative inferential followed by and contrasting with a positive one:
(15) It was not that I felt we had to avoid the Winters at that moment: it was just that it was raining. (lrving 1978: 21314) The second pattern might be called an "embedded tandem," because it contains a single matrix with (at least) two embedded clauses, which contrast with each other on some dimension:
is not that what is denied must first have been asserted, or that positive facts are more real or more basic than negative ones, but simply that knowledge of a positive fact counts for more than knowledge of a negative one. (Horn 1989: 47) In this example the first two clauses are within the scope of the matrix negation; the third clause is outside of the scope of the negation, but nonetheless is a complement of rl rs. The third pattern consists of a negative inferential followed by a positive, non-inferential sentence introduced by a contrastive conjunction, typically but; (17) It is not that mamma cares about it least in the world, but I know it is taken notice of by many persons. (Austen 1980 (Austen [1818 : a7)
The two parts of this type of inferential sequence may be separated from each other by considerable distances, as illustrated by the two italicized sentences in:
(18) "It is rtot that I would fear discov€ry," says he interrupting. "I have never done any serious disservice to either one -at least nothing they would be likely to know of. And even if they should have cause to mistrust me, I am Sir William Cecil's man, and he has been a patron to them both. But -yott should wtderstand this well enough and without knowirtg too much -tlrcre n'ould be qttestiorr. There would be, if only for the sake of friendship and good manners, a delay I cannot afford. (Garrett 1983: 173) The final pattern consists of a negative inferential followed immediately by a positive sentence: I hirvc murkcd the parts of this scquence as (a,b,c) , where (a) is the context that triggcrs thc denial or negation; (b) rs the negative construction; and (c) is the positivc i nt'crcnt ia l. In (b) note the position of rutt and the tbrm of the clause in its scope.' The clausc is subordinate in f'ornr tlut there is no overt matrix ciause in which it is enrbcddcd and substituting It vt,us rutt thut Utlrcr wos ever uttkirul to me for (b) does not alter the tc:xt's well-lirrmcdness or its interpretation."
Sornc posrtive inferentials frllkrw assertions ior which they provide reformulations or rcinterpretations (as I discuss in more detail below):
Hc hiid qot past the stage ot reason, even his power of mocking at himself wirs de ad. or perlnp.s it w,as thot there seemed no longer utt\'thiilc tltut c'ould he ntockad at. (Somerville and Ross 1917: 209110) 'fhese should not bc takcn as an cxhaustive list of the contexts which preccde positive infercntials. It is not possible to provide a complete characterization of thosc contcxts. l'his is bcc:au,;c slrciikers mzry interpolate an inferential wherever thcy l'cel t}:c neccl to explind upon what thcy have just said -either to explain it, or reirttcr;rret it. or dcny lrn inl'crcncc dcr-ivahle from it. "l'he textual positioirs at which -'Htrngarian n,:galivt infercrltirrls cun hc ol this lr)rril -ncg,ator folk;$cc l-.y'lt subordinalc clausc -rvilh no copullr or cxplctivc iir lhc mltrix, 6 Dcclcrck (i9q:) ar[.ucs that thc littt tltat conslruction is nrlt inhcrentlv:,llcc:iiicalionai, althou.qh hc conecdcs tilrlt it crui hc uscd spccificrtl()naii! -as in (2()) -'if thc contc:<l ct;nrains a rarirthlc." l'{s drrcs not idcttiit_v ihc vuriaoic itil :,i1911 fr;r ihc spccifieation:tl rcatling of tlic rtol thut construftion in 12t)). hut clilirns that tire i.'()n5tru{.tion "-\on'cs Lo clarilv thc rclcvancc of thc prcccdinq spcceh ac1" (in ();. (iir,cn thc prohlcns rnhcrrlrl in apph'int spccch act thcory to tcxts such lts titostr l'rr;m u'tiich iiris Clria ts dralvn, tr'u coulil rclsonlhlv suhstitutc "piccc ol text'frtr "spccch act." This ttl rot.t!sL is rr-.!1 r'io:lc ltt ho*'I,ittt chimttrq that thc infcreritiai works. I do aqrct *'ith iiccicrc'k lh:ri n()/ rlirii riiirl tl i.t nttl rl,,r/ r,rnstructiiins arc not always intcrchangt'lble. (21) 'fite inlcrentiol consmtctton 347 the speaker will feel these urges arc unpredictable.
'l'hey are not distingr-rishable as "contain[ing] a variable" as Declerck (1992) cliiims. In fact. texts "contrrin" indefinite numbers of potential "variables." However, manv of thesc sequenccs may be analysed as composcd of three parts. The first part consists of a context which prompts a denial from the speakcr:7 the second (which may be ?L negative inferential) rejects a proposition as either not true or not locally relevant; and the third (positive inferential) introduces a proposition which contrasts with the second in being presented by the speaker as true or relcvant, or provides the narrator's reasons for rejecting the proposition in the second part. In all cilses the interpretation of the inf-erential requires referencc to the local context.
Interpretations of the inferential construction
In this section I consider the range of meanings displaved try thc inferential constructit-ln in context and demonstrate that th';: intr:ny't'iution of un inferential in context is indeterminate. I claim that thc range oi mr:.riiings rcl)rescnts;'r natural class. I end this section bv considering the roles th:rt the inf'erential plays in discourse inferencinq. Quirk et al. (19f15: 1392) in the footnotc in which tlic-!' rctc:r to it, claim that the construction may be'uscd for exprcssions of ptrssihilrtrr irnd (espe ciallv) tilr retle ctive questions.' Their (constructed) examples are:
Possibility and retlection
Notice that hoth of thcse contain moderls irrrri tir;rt the seconrl is ir cluestion. In contrast, the two intererrtials in my corpus whosrr rlirtrix cl;iuses rlre positive, declarative, and contain neither modals nrlr advcrbs do irot rndicatc possioility. The inferential in (23) makes a catesorical assertion:
(23) A problem like this gentleman tlike,,j ;rbtrut so openly might be just a normal pattern for him. and thzrt coullle would fecl better if that woman knew it was his normal pattr-'rrr, shc n:ight find it much easier to accept than if she th<luqht. 'Olt, it lr I'm nol prett)' eruntgh.'
(Donohue transcript no. 03120, citcd in Kies 1!)E8)
Example (2t)c)" which contains an advcrb, asserts thut LJther Pr:ndragcln hild ncl particular interest in a girl child. These examplcs su[qcst that Quirk ct al.'s choclsing modalized forms misled them and that the tornr itselt tlocs not exprc'ss possibility.
(22) a. b.
' The terms 'spcaker' and 'hearer' are appropriate.
It may be that she no longer irusts vou.
Could it bc that you lrl't th'.' k,'..'s it: vnur oil'icc'.)
intcndcd to incluilc writers and rcadcrs as Nonetheless, the form is quite compatible with the expression of possibility, even in declaratives, as the modalized fbrm in Qa) shows:
(24) It may be that you have received report of her death from other sources.
It may also be true -and we pray that it will be so -that by the time this letter is safe in your hands, her servants will have been set free. (Garrctt l9tt3: 140"
As I nclted earlier, an inferential may be modified by an adverb such as perhups, thus providing another means of indicating possibility, as in (21) and: (25) 'He groans when a really good-looking girl meets him. The prettier the worse it takes him. Sometimes he's damned rude.' 'Perhaps it is that women in lreland are not a form of prayer?' (Gogarty 1968: 58-9) Reflection is distinct from possibility. It is the process of attempting to interpret some phenomenon. Ref'lecting may involve asking questions, as in: (26) Morgause sat on the t1oor, leaning her head against Viviane's lap, and
Igraine saw that the sulky eyes were filled with tears. She has us all in her lnnd. How cctrt she have sttch power over us allT Or is it that slte is the only motlrcr Morgause has ever known? She was a grawn woma,t wlrcn Motgause was bont, she has always been motlter, as well as sister, to both of us.Their mother, who had been too old for childbearing, had died giving birth to Morgause. (Bradley 1982:10-11 . Italics in original; emphasis added.)
It can also involve drawing inferences, either categorically, as in (23), or tentatively, as in (25). The inferential construction may represent an interpretation, reflection, or conjecture about an issue relevant to the local context. Its mood, modals, or adverbs indicate the degree of certainty with which the interpretation is proposed.
l. | . Reint e rpre t a tions I refo rmula tiorts
The inferential clause may also represent a reinterpretation or reformulation of an immediately preceding piece of text, more or less tentatively proposed. 8 Declerck (1992: 2}7ft) claims that the sentence italicize<l in Q\ is not an inferential but 'the extraposed version of that you hav'e received report ... nny be ItrueJi this appears, amongst othcr things, from the fact that the next sentence begins with il nny also be tnte that ...' It seems to me that replacing the inferential with Declerck's paraphrase, extraposed or not, subtly but significantly, changes the meaning (and well-formedness) of the text. I have checked this intuition with several colleagues (all native speakers of English, though not all linguists). All agreed that the inferential and ils tnrc congener are not substitutablc in this contexl.
(21) He had got past the stage of reason, even his power of mocking at himself was dead, or perhaps it was that there seemed rto longer anything that could be mocked ut. In spite of his knowledge of the world the position had an aspect that was so serious and beautiful as to overpower the others, and to become one of the mysteries of life into which he had thought himself too cheap and shallow to enter. (Somerville and Ross 1977:209110) In this instance the inferential may be seen as an alternative formulation of the character's state of mind. Moreover, the narrator, by using an inferential and introducing the inferential with perhaps, indicates a limitation on her understanding of the character whose emotions she is describinq.
E xplanat io n s I accou nts
Perhaps the most frequent use of the inferential is to suggest an explanation for whatever circumstances are under discussion. This interpretation occurs amongst all three types, positive unmodalized, modalized, and negative inferentials. The inferential in (23) is an explanation for the couple's sexual difficulties. The inferential in (25) (Austen 1980: 233) That the inf'erential can convey an explanatory interence is confirmed by the fact that when the sentence beginning The explarntion was. . . in (29a) is replaced by an inferential, as in (29b), the two versions of the text are well-tbrmed and synonymous.
(ze)a.
P. Delahunty
In England a new ruling element had displaced much of the existing landholding class. but had been content to divert to itself the labour and produce of the indigenous rural population. When the Normans had expanded into Wales, however, they had established new communities, which came to be known as 'Englishries', in the valley floors, while confining the Welsh inhabitants, by and large, to the uplands. The explanatiotr was, not tlnt tlre Normarts were more hostile towards tlrc Wel.slt than lownrds tlte Atryk> Saxorts, but rather that Welslt rural society, witlt its pastorul emphasis, was ttot geared to the satisfactory workirtg of arable land. (Frame 1981: 77) It was not that the Normans were more hostile towards the Welsh than towards the Anglo-Saxons, [...] .
(2e)b.
The ditt'erence between the versions is that in the original (29a) it is made explicit that the propositions in the italicized subordinate clauses are to be interpreted as an explanation for the differences between the Norman colonizations of England and Wales. This interpretation is lefl implicit in the adapted version (2eb).
The claim that the clause of an inferential sentence may be interpreted as an explanation tor some situation or event is further supported by Kuno's account of the Japanese no desu construction. He claims that rto da (informal), no desu (polite), and tto de aru (formal writing) can be "roughly translated as 'it is that" ' (1973: 223) . Desu and its variants are copulas and no is a nominalizing particle. Kuno (1973: 223, no (31) Kaze o hikimasita. Ame ni hurarete nureta no desu cold drew rain fallen-being got-wet 'I have caught a cold. (Lit.) The explanation for my having caught a cold is that I was rained on and drenched.' (Kuno 1973: 221,, no. 3a) Kuno discusses interrogative forms of the !o desu construction and translates them as requests for the hearer's explanation of some situation. Ka is an interrogative particle.
(32) Kaoiro ga warui desune. Byooki na no desu ka? sick complexion bad 'You don't look well. Is theexplanation for your not looking well that you are sick?' (Kuno 7973: 225, no. 4a) In a number of his examples Kuno adds 'or evidence' to the gloss of the construction. For example:
(33) Byooki desu. Taizyuu ga ryuppondo hetta no desu sick weight ten-pounds lessened 'I am sick. The explanation (or evidence) for my being sick is that I have lost ten pounds.' (Kuno 1973: 226, no. 6a) Some of these Japanese examples can be felicitously translated into English using the inferential construction. For example:
(34) You don't look well. Is it that you are ill? (35) I caught a cold. It's that I was caught in the rain and drenched. (36) ?I"am ill. It is that I have lost ten pounds.
The Japanese r?o desu construction seems to have a somewhat different and larger range of interpretations than the English inferential. It may be that the Japanese construction has conventionalized the interpretation of explanation or evidence. This is consistent with the tact that it contrasts directly with the kara destt construction, which seems to have the conventional interpretation of "it is because..." For example:
(37) Kaze o hikimasita. Ame ni hurarete nureta kara desu.
cold drew rain by fallen-being wet-got 'I have caught a cold. It is because I was rained on and drenched.' (Kuno 1973:226,, no. 5) Further, the no desa construction can be used either to provide an explanation (or evidence) for what has been said or for what has been observed. In other words it does not require a prior linguistic context. The interrogative form particularly seems to be able to occur without one, for example:
(38) Dokoka e iku no desu ka? somewhere go '(l see that you are preparing to go out.) Is the explanation for this that you are going somewhere?' (Kuno 1973: 225, no. 4c) It is unlikely that an English speaker, upon seeing someone preparing to go out, would say 'ls it that you are going somewhere?' rather than 'Are you going somewhere?' or 'Where are you going?' In this context the no desu construction marks the information in the clause as an interpretation of its context and thus may provide an indirect way of asking where the addressee is going or why they are leaving. Indeed, Kuno (1973:233) suggests that "[i]n the immediate environment in which the speaker has made some observation, questions about the observation without using the no desu construction are often out of place. For example, in talking to a girl who is crying the (a) sentences are out of place: (3e) a.
*Naite-imasu ka?
Are you crying? *Naze naite-imasu ka?
Why are you crying? Naite-iru no desu ka? Is it that you are crying? Naze naite-iru no desu ka? Why is it that you are crying?" Kuno offers no explanation for why the (a) questions are out of place. Perhaps it is because they do not mark the girl's crying as an interpretation, unlike the two (b) questions, which do, thereby adding a degree of indirectness and politeness. Or perhaps the no desu construction has grammaticalized the explanation interpretation.
Notice of course that 'Is it that you are crying?' is infelicitous in English in this context, presumably because English speakers do not normally treat what they directly observe as an interpretation, even for politeness' sake. As Kuno does not discuss modifications to the no desu construction analogous to the English adverbs, modals, and negation, it is impossible at this stage of our understanding of these constructions to be certain of how similar they are in Japanese and English. We can, however, note that the tensed clause in inferentials is in subject position, and that no expletive occurs in these sentences in Japanese (or Korean). These constructions may be used to make assertions that implicate cause and explanation. And indeed the English examples discussed here translate straightforwardly into Japanese. For example, (40) translates Ir's that I'm not pretty enough.
(40) Watashi-ga kiree-de-nai-kara na-no-desu I-SM pretty-is-NEG-since is-COMP-ise Closely related to explanations are reasons and causes.
Reasons
In (41), the clause is interpreted as a reason for him being cruel to her.
(41) Perhaps, if she had not been so frightened and rebellious in those days, she might have seen that he was eager to please her then too. He had not been cruel to her, or if he was, i/ was only that he seemed to know liltle of women's bodies and how to use them. (Bradley 1982 : 
Causes
In (23) the clause, 'I'm not pretty enough' represents the cause of 'his problem.'h (42) three potential causes of the delay in global warming are proposed in the three coordinated inferential clauses.
(42) If the observed temperature increase really is a greenhouse warming and not just "noise" -a random fluctuation -one might account for the disparity in various ways. Perhaps the models are simply twice too sensitive to small increases in greenhouse gasses, or perhaps the incomplete and inhomogeneous network of thermometers has underestimated the global warming. Conceivably some other factor, not well accounted for in the models, is delaying or counteracting the warming. It might be that the heat capacity of the oceons is larger than cuffenr models calculate, that the sLut's output has declined slightly or that volcanoes have injected more dust into the stratosphere than is cuffentty known, thereby reducing the solar energ/ reaching the ground. (Schneider 1989) 43. Conclusions
The clause may represent a conclusion drawn from the context.
(43) Lichardus' model is a variant of a broader explanation of the cultural change seen throughout both Northern and Central Europe in the late Neolithic. [Extensive discussion of the shortcomings of the model.] It is rtot that the model is wrong; there is just not enough evidence proposed to evaluate it. (Mallory 1989: 253) In (a3) the inferential invites the inference that the conclusion to draw from all of the counter evidence adduced is not that the model is wrong, rather there is just not enough evidence to evaluate it. Beyond this we might add that given all the counter evidence that the author presents, a reader might be forgiven for concluding that the author believes that the model is wrons.
4,3.I. Re sults I c onse quenc es
Closely related to conclusions are results and consequences.
(44) Someone -Rubinstein, maybe -once said, when asked if he believed in God: "Oh, no, I believe in something much bigger." And someone else -was it Chesterton? -said that when men stop believing in God, it istt't that they then believe in nothing: They believe in everything. (Eco l9fi9: 620) 'o ln (44) the inferential licenses the inference that the result of mcn stopping believing in God is not that they then believe in nothing.
Relevant alternative comparisons lcontrasts
The clause. especially when the matrix contains just or only, mtty represent an alternative comparison or contrast to one expressed in the krcal c<tntext. 'But so we all do. 1r is orilv tltat he hus better meons o.f hovirtg it than motv ollrcrs, becuttse he is ich, urtd mart,v others ore poor. I speak t-eelingly. A younger son, you know, must be enurecl to self-denial and dependence.' (Austen 1813 (Austen [1963 : 15311)
In (a5) Fitzwilliams' interential proposes an interpretation of Darcy's behavior or personality that contrasts with Eliza Bennett's, namely that Darcy is ric:her than many others and so can indulge himself more than they can. The inferential in (46) expresses an alternative interpretation of the histrtrical facts that contrasts with the interpretation suggested in the immecliately prirlr text. (46) It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to describe the lrish Church from the sixth century on as a monastic Church. There were bishops throughout Ireland who carried out functions specitic to them aktne. The fact that there wits no late Roman diocesan structure which could be taken over by the Church was not just the case in lreland; it was evident in all areas outside the boundaries of the Roman Empire. 1r is jtut that Ireland was the first coLntry in Weskm Ettrope to feel the fitll impact of the,se circumstances. 4.5. Indeterminacy of interpretation Many of these. examples can be entered under several ditferent interpretive l0 Example (44) is a translation of thc original ltalian, which has the corresponding to the italicizcd English: non i che non credano piu a nulla the null subiect and the other lexical and svntactic clcments characrcristic following infercntial (Eco 1988: 492) . Note of inferentials.
categories. What this means is that we cannot be sure of our interpretation of the sentences in their contexts; that is, we cannot he certain that the implicatures we derive are actuallv the ones intended by the speaker. This of course is exactly as Grice predicted (1975: 5fl) :
"Since tcl calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the cooperative principle is heing <lbserved, and since there may be various specific explanations, a list of which'mav be open, the conversational implicatum in such cases will be disjunction of such specific explanations, and if the list of these is open, tlrc implicatum will hut,e just the kind of indetenninacy tltat many actual implicata do in fact seam Io heve." (My italics.)
Iror example, (23) It's I'm not pretry' enough.. . can be interpreted as a reason for. or a cause of, rlr an explanation for. or an interpretaticln of the man's pattern or problem. We have no way of knowing just which of these possibilities is intended by the speaker. indced, there is no reason to assume that the speaker intended any specific one of them, as opposed to simply prompting zill and leaving it to the hearer to make a chclice (or not).
More significantly, we can view all of these categories as representing a single natural ciass: They all represent aspects of interpretation. So the inferential always represents an interpretation of the krcal contcxt. its precise interpretation as an explanation, reflection, etc. depcnds upon its particular context. Indeed the range of particuiar implicatures scems to be limited to those which have to do with interpretation. To ret-lect on, explain, clr identify the consequences of some situation (or text) is to interpret it. By analysing the inferential as representing an interpretation of its local context, we can account naturally for this limitation.
The roles of the inferential atnstruction in disuturse inferencing
I assume that the intcrpretation of discclurse by its participants is a process of deriving inferences -from the language used and its interaction with its context. In this section I will briefly cclnsidcr in mclre general terms the roles played by the proposition expressed bv the ciause of the inferential construction in the interpretation of discourse. This proposition can tunction as either a conclusion or a premise.
If thc tnf'erence represents a conclusion, then it is one that can be derived tiom the irrintcdiately prior text. either alone or in conjunction with implicated premises or bridging assumptions. The conclusion also can be aflirmed, qualified, or denied. Example (47) is a clrar case of an inf'erred conclusictn.
(.ai 1 Lichardus' model is a variant of a broader explanation of the cultural chattges seen throughilut both Northern and Central Europe in the Llte: Ncolithic.
[Paragraph continues detailing problems with Lichardris' mildcl.] It is ttttl thut tlw tnrrlel is wrong; there is lust not eni;ugh criiJcncc pir.rltitscrt to cvulu;rtc it. (l\'laliory 1989:253) The problems attributed by Mallory to the Lichardus model along with the assumption that the enumeration of a model's problems are usually suftlcient *u..unt to conclude that (the author thinks that and expects the reader to conclude that) the model is wrong. The author rejects this conclusion and postpones evaluation of the model.
If the inference represents a premise (usually a minor one) then the propositions represented by the (immediately) prior text, or derivable from it, can te deduced from the inferential proposition in conjunction with other, usually implicated (rather than overtly stated) premises or bridging assumptions. Inferences inttrpreted as premises are often, though by no means solely, interpreted as explanationr, ,urr"., or reasons. The premise can be affirmed, qualified' or denied. Example (48) Frorn the text prior to the inferential we can derive the assumption that Wentworth did not write to ask Anne Elliot to renew their engagement.
'I did not think of it, or desire it' represents a (minor) premise from which, with other readily available assumptions, Wentworth's not writing to ask would follow, and thereby explain why he ^hadn't written. Wentworth summarily rejects this explanation' and provides an alternative ('I was proud, too proud to ask again').11
Negative inferentials
Because they do not entirely parallel their positive counterparts, inferentials with a negated matrix require a brief separate comment. We should expect negative infErentials simply io deny the inferences licensed by their positives, and for the most part this ishow they function. Clearly, negative inferentials can reject the truth 1l The inferencing can be laid out as the following syllogism:
If Wcntworth did not think of it, or desire it, then he would not write' Wentworth did not think of it, or desire it. Therefore Wentworth did not write. The proposition derived from the clause of an inferential may be entertained eithcr as a premise or as a conclusion, or both: lf Wentworth did not write then he did not think of it, or desire it. Wentworlh did not write. Therefore Wentworth did not think of it, or desire it. The indeterminacy of the role played by rhe proposition is a further sour@ of indeterminacy in their interpretation. My thanks to Jim Garvey for discussion on this topic. of the information in the clause: (49) "Nance was sayin' l.ambert was gone to Dublin again, but what signifies what the likes of her'd say; it couldn't be he'd be goin' in it agin and he not home a week from it." (sic) (Somerville and Ross 1977:264) However, they may reject, not the truth, but the relevance of an assertion or an assumption at the point in the discourse at which they occur:
(50) On principle I usually avoid introducing my friends and acquaintances to each other. It is not that one fears treachery, though of course one does. What human fear is deeper? But endless little unnecessary troubles usually result from such introductions.t2 (Murdoch 7975: 43) Similarly, the negative inferential in (a7) is compatible with either the model being right or being wrong. Its function is to forestall the reader's inference that the author's litany of the model's inadequacies leads to the conclusion that it is wrong.
Negative inferentials may also deny an inference which would provide a plausible explanation relevant in the context. In (50) the negative inferential rejects the proposition that the narrator fears treachery as the explanation for his reluctance to introduce his friends and acquaintances to each other, a perfectly plausible explanation for his behavior, and an inference that might be made by any reasonable audience. The sentence immediately following concedes this fear. And the third sentence provides the explanation that the narrator wants the audience to accept.
A negative inferential may also deny a plausible interpretation of, or extrapolation from, its context, in the following case, the extrapolation that demon lovers are usually grossly cruel: (51) It was ... as if she had died long before and come back to me as a demon lover. Demon lovers are always relentless, however kind in life. And it was sometimes as if t could 'remember' Christian's kindness, though all now was spite and demonry. It was not that she was usually, tltottglt slrc was sametimes, grossty cruel. (Murdoch I975: e1-z).
Only one of my collection of negative inferentials contains a modal, (49) above. The negative takes scope over the modal and we can paraphrase (49) as the negation of a possibility:
(52) It is not possible that he would be going there again.
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Replacing the inferential in this text with a sentence such as It is not the case that one fears teachery renders the text contradictory. This supports my contention that the inferential is specialized in function and contrasts with sentences such as those with predicates such as 'true'
or'the case' in the matrix.
Many of the inferentials in the corpus, both positive and negative, contain matrix adverbs, typically only, just,, or simply. These limit the domain of a contrast. In (45), the contrast between Darcy and'we all' is initially proposed to be that he likes his own way, but is subsequently limited to his merely being richer than the others, and so better able to afford to indulge himself.
In examples which contain both matrix adverbs and negation, the adverb falls within the scope of the negative. When the adverb is only, the exhaustiveness of the inference is denied. The following passage asserts that Anne Elliot could never accept Mr. Elliot not only because her feelings were adverse to him but also because her judgment was against him:
(53) She never could accept him. And it was rtot only that her feelings were still udverse to any matt save otrc; her judgment, on a serious consideration of the possibilities of such a case, was against Mr. Elliot. (Austen 1980 (Austen [1818 : 152)
When the adverb isjast or simply,, the denial may be either of exhaustiveness rur of a limitation of the domain of contrast: (54) 'I wish, I wish she hadn't met Arnold.' 'You're very attached to Arnold, aren't you?' 'Yes.' 'lt's rtot just that you core what he thinks?'13 'No.' (Murdoch 1975: 117) So, there is a general, though not perfect, parallelism between positive and negative inferentials. The negative denies the various inferences licensed by the positive. Typically, negative inferentials occur in the context of contrasting claims, most clearly exemplified in the tandem constructions. We can reasonably interpret the pattern as:
'The inference to draw from (the utterance) of this expression is not that p; rather it is that q) ln this respect inferentials are akin tu repairs in conversation. Many negated inferentials raise the issue of what prompts the inf-erence rejected by the speaker. In some cases, e.g. (49), the inferential clause merely rejects 13 Declerck (1992:221, fn 8) paraphrases this infercntial as'the narLtre of your feelings for Amold" is not just that you care what he thinks?, a paraphrase which is hardly grammatical and certainly not consistent with his analysis. He claims (p.220) that the expressions that replace the cxpletive i/ are 'automatically taken from the group rcason/cause/explanation/interpretation," a claim which cries out for explanation. Clearly the narure of your feelings for Amold does not fit naturally into this class. The current analysis suggests a paraphrase such as the following, which fits the text better: I ant not to interpret vour agreeing that you are very attached to Amold to nrcan just that you care what he thinks?
In fact, Declerck's analvsis is not nearly restrictive enough. There are many nouns that form a natural scmantic class with reason, explaruilion, etc., which can appear in the copular structure'NPrr that',and which express a notion whose contents can be specified by a thatclause, e.g. et'idence (see my discussion of Kuno's analysis), fact, allegation, forecast, prediction, position, but which do not appear to figure in the interpretation of inferential il rs (not) that sentences. This limitation follows naturally from the current analysis. a proposition expressed in the prior sentence. But most cases are not so straightforward. Some propositions are derived from generally held beliefs, others from stereofypes. The interential in (18) derives from the assumption that spies fear discovery; that in (55) represents an inference based on the assumption that rich people who live 'not immodest' lives are merely pretending to be 'ordinary chaps':
(55) I should make it clear that Arnold was not in any crude sense'spoilt' by success. He was no tax-dodger with a yacht and a house in Malta. ... He lived in a fairly large, but not immodest suburban villa in a 'good class'housing estate in Ealing. His domestic lif'e was, even to an irritating extent, lacking in style. It was not iltat he put on an act of being 'the ordinary chap'. (Murdoch 1975: 3I) Narrators may produce a negative inferential when they wish, sincerely or manipulatively, to introduce an interpretation of an aspect of the context which they want to reject. However, some examples contain information which is not likely to be inferred by the hearer from the local context. The negative inferential acts as an instruction to the hearer to establish and then reject an inferential connection (eg. explanation, conclusion, etc.) with the local context.
Why would a speaker mention a proposition which is unlikely to be interred by the hearer only to reject it immediately? To amuse and disarm, as in the following e-mail message from the chair of my department: More interestingly, because the form reveals inferences made by its speaker, it can be used by authors to reveal the thoughts of a fictional character or narrator. Several of my examples (e.g. (50)) are produced by the narrator of Murdoch (1975) and help to undermine his reliability.la
Inferentials: An analysis
The hypothesis to be explored here is that the inferential can be viewed as a pragmatic instruction to its audience to regard its clause as an interpretation of its local context, that is, to be about, rather than of, its context. The specific interpretations, described in section 4,, are to be seen as particular interpretations of particular contexts. Consjder the following pair:
la Whether relevance as opposecl to truth is always at issue with inferentials will be dealt with in the next section. Certainly (47) and (50) Women in Ireland are nclt a form of prayer. It is that women in Ireland are not a form of prayer.
(57a) merely reports that women in lreland are not a form of prayer; (57b) on the other hand, invites the inference that the proposition women in lreland are not o for of prayer has some special relevance to the local text. Utterances seem in general to have two very distinct types of roles in discourse: They can be either contextually or metacontextually relevant. That is, they can fit with their contexts in ways which we might characterize as ordinary, e.g., adding information, or they may have an extraordinary relevance by commenting on their contexts. In this section I will account for the strictly local relevance of inferentials, and argue that their interpretation involves two stages. The first stage involves the interpretation of the inferential construction as a generalized conversational implicature licensed by the construction's form, namely that the proposition represented by the clause is an interpretation of the local context. The second stage involves calculating the potential particularized implicatures of a construction in its specific context; that is, calculating just how the inferential might be an interpretation of its specific context.
That the inferential relates to the local context follows from Grice's CP, which requires that a participant's contribution 'be such as is required at the stage at which it occurs,' from the submiuim of manner "Be orderly," and from the fact that there is nothing to indicate that the sentence has a non-local relevance. Any speaker/writer intending a non-local relevance would be in violation of the submaxim of manner "Avoid obscurity." Note, of course, that although the inferential interprets the immediately prior text (nr immediate context, in the case of Japanese), the extent of that text (or context) is not fixed. This is another source of the indeterminacy of the meaning of inferentials.
In support of the claim that the construction, because of its form, licenses a generalized conversational implicature, note that such implicatures are detachable and calculable (Levinsctn 19t13: 12U) .15
As we have seen from the data presented in this paper, inferential sentences, whether positive or negativc, interrogative or modalized, all instruct their hearers to regard the clause as an interpretation of the local context; that is, the same general inference follows from all inferentials.
'l'his inference can be detached, as is generally the case with implicatures dependent upon the form of the utterance. If we remove the matrix, we may lose the inferential interpretation. Compare (57a) and (57b). The inf'erential eftect can be calculated as there are iust two ways in which 15 Usually, conversaticlnal implicatures are canccllablc. However, it seems to me that a speaker producing an expression whosc form w<luld ordinarily license an implicature is unlikely to be believed if they claimed that the form has no relevance at all. For example, a parent who spells a message out to a spouse in the hearing of a preliterate child can hardly deny that they do so with some intention, such as that of excluding the child from the intended audience. Likewise, the generalized conversational implicature licensed by the inferential construction seems not to be cancellable. In this respect it is like a conventional implicature, and may in some languages, such as Japanese, pei'haps, have becomc conventionalized. However, if the construction licensed conventional rather than convcrsational implicatures, we could not explain how it licenses the same implicatures in languagc aftcr language.
a new proposition is integrated with those that have gone before it: It can have either ordinary or extraordinary relevance. That is, its relevance can only be either contextual or metacontextual. The calculation might go as follows. A speaker has used an inferential such as (57b) whose conventional meaning is the same as that of the corresponding non-inferential (57a).
So, given a choice between (57a) and (57b), why would a speaker choose the expression consisting of a that clause subordinated to semantically empty it and be? (57b) cannot mean just (57a) because this would violate the maxim of manner, specifically the injunction to be brief. It would also violate the maxim of relation, as the matrix would have no relevance.
Nor can (57b) convey less than (57a) because (57a) represents the conventional meaning of (57b), the minimal information represented by both. If (57b) meant less than (57a), a hearer could not work out the significance of (57b) because the matrix, having no conventional meaning, gives hearers no clue as to what information in (57b) to disregard. So a speaker using (57b) to convey less information than (57a) would be in violation of the maxim of manner's injunction against obscurity.
It follows that (57b) must have more significance than (57a). This extra significance cannot be conventional because if it were the speaker would be being obscure and so in violation of manner, and perhaps also in violation of quantity in not supplying sufficient information for the circumstances, as we are given no clues as to what that conventional extra might be.
Consequently, the extra significance associated with (57b) must have to do with the relationship of the information represented in it to its context, i.e. its relevance, because, ex lrypothesi, there are only two possibilities: Either the proposition represents information that is integrated into the interpretation of the text as ordinarily topical, or it has some special, extra relevance. It is relevant as information about the context.
Significantly in this regard, because its interpretation crucially involves the maxim of relation, it is the proposition's relevance, rather than its truth, which is important in the context. Example (50) pointedly illustrates this characteristic. Negative inferentials deny, not the truth, but the (special) relevance of the proposition represented by an inferential's clause. Truth, although necessary for relevance, is certainly not sufficient.
In sum, the generalized conversational implicature of the inf-erential is that the clause represents an interpretation of the local discourse context.
On the other hand, the further interpretation of the clause as a reflection, explanation, conclusion, etc., must be derived from the interpretation of the inferential as a comment on the context, and the particulars of that context, in accordance with Grice's CP and maxims. In other words, this interpretation consists of a set of particularized conversational implicatures. They are particularized solutions to the problem of discovering the specific special relevance of a particular inferential sentence in a particular context. They have the characteristics of such implicatures: They are vague and must be calculated, as Grice claimed. They are also defeasible: The audience can never be certain that the particular implicatures they derive are the ones intended, and consequently any particular inferences can be denied.
Finally, the construction appears to have the same or very similar interpretations in all the languages in which it occurs. This universality can only result from universal principles of pragmatic interpretation, such as the CP and maxims. It fbllows that the interpretations of inferentials must be non-conventional. If we assume that hearers draw inferences as they create meanings, and if we also assume that a speaker's goal is to ensure that the hearer entertains only the interpretation he or she intends, then we can view the inferential torm as an instruction to the audience to infer an interpretational relationship between the clause and the local context. If the inferential contains matrix negation then it indicates that an infercnce which may be plausible in the context is not intended by the narrator. The adverbs and modals which occur in many interentials indicate the scope of the relevance of the inf-erential propositions and the degree <tf faith the speaker has in them.
Conclusion
What inferentials do is inclicate thut the clause is tcl be regarded as an interpretation of the local context. Negative int'erentials deny the interpretation; positive inferentials aftirm it; and inferentials with adverbs or modals indicate the degree of confidence to be placed in the interpretaticlns. This function clf the interential is tir iiccnse a _eene ralizcd conversational implicature which is consequently the responsibilitv of the spcaker.
Infcrcntials conversiitronallv license the particularized int'erences that the cluusc is (or rs not) a conclusion. account. explanation, reason, possibility, retlection, ctc.
'l'he r-:hoicc amongst thesc int'erences is the responsibility of the hearer.
The interaction bctween interpretations for which the speaker is responsible and interprctations for which thc hearer is responsible can give the impression that the speaker appears to be making assumptions about inferences being made by the hearer in the interprctive process. By revealing what the speaker appears to think that the hearer assurnes, the construction can be used by skilled writers to reveal the concerns of narrators, somctimcs to suggest their limitations and unreliability.
Given that a speaker must guide an audience along an interpretational path, licensing certain inferences and rejecting others, it should not be surprising that languages provide specialized sentence structures whose function is to indicate interpretations of local context. Nor should it be surprising to find that these constructions occur in identifiable discourse patterns designed specifically to indicate that the speaker wants the hearer to draw, not this interence, but that other one. And, given the universality ot thr: pragnratic principles upon which the inferential construction relies. it is not surprising either that the construction has the same t'unctions across languages.
